Congestion games model several interesting applications, including routing and network formation games, and also possess attractive theoretical properties, including the existence of and convergence of natural dynamics to a pure Nash equilibrium. Weighted variants of congestion games that rely on sharing costs proportional to players' weights do not generally have pure-strategy Nash equilibria. We propose a new way of assigning costs to players with weights in congestion games that recovers the important properties of the unweighted model. This method is derived from the Shapley value, and it always induces a game with a (weighted) potential function. For the special cases of weighted network cost-sharing and weighted routing games with Shapley value-based cost shares, we prove tight bounds on the worst-case inefficiency of equilibria. For weighted network cost-sharing games, we precisely calculate the price of stability for any given player weight vector, while for weighted routing games, we precisely calculate the price of anarchy, as a parameter of the set of allowable cost functions.
INTRODUCTION
Congestion games are a well-studied generalization of several game-theoretic models, including some fundamental network formation games and routing games. In the standard model [Rosenthal 1973a ], there is a ground set of resources, and each player has a set of allowable strategies, each of which is a subset of resources. For example, the strategies of a player could correspond to the paths of a network with a given source and sink. Each resource has a per-user cost that depends on the number of players that use it, and the goal of each player is to minimize the sum of the resources' costs in its strategy, given the strategies chosen by the other players. In atomic selfish routing games [Rosenthal 1973b; Roughgarden and Tardos 2002] , strategies correspond to paths, and the per-unit cost function c e (·) of each resource e is nondecreasing. In network cost-sharing games [Anshelevich et al. 2008] , strategies correspond to paths, and the (decreasing) cost functions have the form c e (x e ) = γ e /x e , where γ e is the fixed installation cost of edge e and x e is the number of players that share it.
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For the special case of network cost-sharing games, the symmetric joint cost function C e (·) is insensitive to players' weights. To introduce weight-dependent cost shares, we use the weighted Shapley value [Kalai and Samet 1987; Shapley 1953] , which averages over orderings of the players in a nonuniform way (see the next section for a definition). The resulting cost shares are increasing in weight and coincide with proportional shares (for all weight vectors) if and only if there are at most two players (Figure 1(b) ). These facts explain why, with proportional cost shares, PNE always exist with two players [Anshelevich et al. 2008] but not with at least three [Chen and Roughgarden 2009] .
We also provide tight bounds on the inefficiency of equilibria in SV weighted network cost-sharing and atomic selfish routing games. For weighted atomic selfish routing games, we give tight bounds on the worst-case price of anarchy (POA) [Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou 1999] -the ratio between the cost of the worst PNE and of an optimal outcome-with respect to every set of convex cost functions and a worst-case set of player weights. This worst-case POA is slightly larger than that in weighted congestion games with proportional cost shares that have PNE. For example, in routing games with cost functions that are polynomials with degree at most d and nonnegative coefficients, the POA with proportional cost shares is ≈ (c 1 · d/ ln d) d+1 (when PNE exist) [Aland et al. 2011] and with Shapley value cost shares is ≈ (c 2 · d) d+1 , where c 1 ≈ 1.3 and c 2 ≈ 0.9 are constants independent of d. See also Table I . We establish these POA upper bounds with a "smoothness proof " in the sense of Roughgarden [2009] , so these upper bounds apply more generally to all mixed Nash, correlated, and coarse correlated equilibria of these games. Thus, Shapley cost shares restore PNE to weighted routing games at the expense of modestly increasing inefficiency.
For network cost-sharing games, we focus on the price of stability (POS) [Anshelevich et al. 2008] , which is the ratio between the cost of the best PNE and of an optimal 
solution. The worst-case POA is uninteresting in such games because it equals k, the number of players, no matter how players' cost shares are defined [Chen et al. 2010, Proposition 4.12] . Our main result here is a characterization of the POS as a function of the weight vector w. For every w, we give an explicit lower bound on the POS and prove a matching upper bound for all networks. The special case of w = (1, 1, . . . , 1)-where the worst-case POS is the kth Harmonic number-is one of the main results in Anshelevich et al. [2008] . Our lower bound is a straightforward extension of that in Anshelevich et al. [2008] , but our matching upper bound requires a fundamentally new argument. The upper bound in Anshelevich et al. [2008] for unweighted players follows directly from the proximity between the potential and objective functions; with weighted players, the difference between these two functions can be arbitrarily larger than the POS. Our characterization implies, for example, that the POS remains O(log k) if players' weights differ by a constant factor, and is O( √ k) when w i = i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k. With proportional cost shares, when PNE exist, the POS can be as large as the sum of the players' weights (assuming that min i w i = 1) [Chen and Roughgarden 2009] . In this sense, weighted Shapley cost shares both restore PNE to weighted network cost-sharing games and decrease the inefficiency of such equilibria.
THE WEIGHTED SHAPLEY VALUE
We first recall the weighted Shapley value [Kalai and Samet 1987; Shapley 1953] . Consider a set S of players and a cost function C : 2 S → R. (For us, S is the users of a resource and C(T ) is the joint cost that would be incurred if the players of T ⊆ S were its sole users.) For a given ordering π of the players,
, where S i (π ) denotes the players preceding i in π . Each player has a positive weight w i and a sampling parameter λ i set to 1/w i [Kalai and Samet 1987; Shapley 1953 ]. We use the λ i 's to define a distribution over orderings of players, as follows. (When all λ i 's are equal, we recover the uniform distribution and the usual Shapley value.) We first choose the final player in the ordering, with probabilities proportional to the λ i 's; given this choice, we choose the penultimate player randomly from the remaining ones, again with probabilities proportional to the λ i 's; and so on. The weighted Shapley value of player i is defined as the expected value of i (π ) with respect to this distribution over orderings π .
An equivalent way of defining this distribution over orderings of the players is the following. With each player i, we associate a random variable X i that is exponentially distributed with rate λ i . The realized ordering of the players is then considered to be the one that has the corresponding X i variables in decreasing order (i.e., the player with the largest X i value is the first in the ordering and the player with the smalllest X i value is the last in the ordering). The intuition behind the equivalence of the two definitions is the following. Suppose we observe the values of the X i variables as they increase from 0, until they reach their realized values. The probability that some given X i is the next to stop increasing is proportional to the rate of the corresponding player, that is, λ i / j∈S λ j , due to the fact that the random variables are exponential. (See [Kalai and Samet 1987] for more details and a more formal treatment.)
CONGESTION GAMES WITH SHAPLEY VALUE COST SHARES
Sections 3.1 and 3.2 propose novel cost shares with weighted players in network costsharing games and routing games, respectively, which ensure the existence of purestrategy Nash equilibria. Section 3.3 explains the general construction for arbitrary congestion games.
Network Cost-Sharing Games
In an SV network cost-sharing game, each player i = 1, 2, . . . , k has a weight w i ≥ 1 and a sampling parameter λ i = 1/w i . We can assume that w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ · · · ≤ w k and we do so for the rest of the article. Player i aims to construct a path P i from a given node s i to a given node t i in a directed graph G = (V, E), where every e ∈ E has a fixed nonnegative cost γ e . With respect to a fixed path vector P, we write S e for the users of edge e. The cost function C e corresponding to edge e is C e (S e ) = γ e if S e = ∅ and C e (S e ) = 0 if S e = ∅.
We next give a probabilistic representation of weighted Shapley cost shares and the corresponding potential function, in terms of independent exponentially distributed random variables, as in the last paragraph of Section 2. Let T be a subset of the players. For every player i ∈ T , let X i be an exponentially distributed random variable with rate λ i . We then define the per-unit weighted Shapley share of i on an edge e used by the players T as the probability that X i is the largest random variable among those associated with T .
Definition 3.1. In an SV network cost-sharing game, the weighted Shapley share of player i ∈ S e for using the edge e is
For the joint cost functions under discussion (equal to γ e for every nonempty set), Definition 3.1 coincides with the definition given in Section 2. Since the value i (π ) is γ e for the first player of π and 0 otherwise, the equivalence follows. Weighted Shapley shares are always increasing in a player's weight. If a set S e contains at most two players, then the cost shares of Definition 3.1 are proportional to the players' weights. This is not generally true with three or more players.
Example 3.2. Suppose γ e = 1 and S e = {1, 2} with w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 2. Since the edge has unit cost, the weighted Shapley share of player 1 is the probability that 1 is first in the random ordering described in Section 2. Hence, it is equal to the probability that 2 is picked in the first sampling step, which gives us
Similarly, χ 2,e ({1, 2}) = 2/3, and the cost shares are proportional to the players' weights. Now suppose that player 3 with w 3 = 1 joins edge e. The weighted Shapley share of 1 is again the probability that 1 is first in the random ordering. This is now
Since w 3 = w 1 , we also have χ 3,e ({1, 2, 3}) = 7/30, and then χ 2,e ({1, 2, 3}) = 1 − 2 · 7/30 = 8/15. These cost shares are not proportional to the players' weights.
We next show that every SV network cost-sharing game with the cost shares of Definition 3.1 admits a (weighted) potential function. Define the function by
where the edge potential e is defined as
PROPOSITION 3.3. For every pair P and P = (P −i , P i ) of path vectors that differ only in the ith component,
where C i denotes the sum of the cost shares paid by player i.
PROOF. We prove that every edge contributes the same amount to the left-and righthand sides of (3). If e ∈ P i ∩ P i or e / ∈ P i ∪ P i , there is nothing to prove. By symmetry, we can assume that e ∈ P i \ P i . We need to show that
where S e is the set of players that use e in P.
The left-hand side of (4) is the difference between e (P ) = γ e · E max j∈S e ∪{i} X j and e (P) = γ e · E max
The maxima inside the expectations are different only when X i is larger than the corresponding random variable of every player of S e . Conditioning on this event and using the fact that the exponential distribution is memoryless, the conditional expected difference between the two maxima is 1/λ i = w i . Hence e (P )− e (P)
As in Rosenthal [1973a] and Monderer and Shapley [1996] , the existence of a weighted potential function has immediate consequences. First, by (3), the outcome with minimum potential function value is a PNE. Moreover, every iteration of betterresponse dynamics-in which a player switches strategies to strictly decrease its coststrictly decreases the potential function. Thus, better-response dynamics converges, necessarily to a PNE. COROLLARY 3.4. In every SV network cost-sharing game, better-response dynamics converges to a PNE.
SV Atomic Selfish Routing
In an SV atomic selfish routing game, each player i = 1, 2, . . . , k has a weight w i and selects a path P i from a node s i to a node t i in a given graph G = (V, E). For every edge e ∈ E, the per-unit cost function c e (·) is nonnegative and nondecreasing. Its users S e have to pay a joint cost of
where x e is their total weight. The joint cost function (5) is asymmetric, meaning that its value depends on the identities of the players in the set S e and not just on |S e |. This is in contrast with weighted network cost-sharing games, where the asymmetry is exogenous to the (symmetric) joint cost function. For this reason, the standard (unweighted) Shapley value already gives meaningful weight-dependent cost shares in routing game with nonuniform player weights, and these are the cost shares proposed next. That is, we take the sampling parameter λ i from Section 2 to be 1 for every player i (and not 1/w i ). Section 3.3 outlines a natural generalization that accommodates both asymmetric cost functions and exogenous player asymmetry.
Definition 3.5. In an SV atomic selfish routing game, the Shapley share of player i ∈ S e on edge e is
where S i e (π e ) denotes the players preceding i in π e , a uniformly random ordering of S e . The cost shares in Definition 3.5 are generally proportional to players' weights if and only if the per-unit cost function c e is affine.
Example 3.6. Suppose c e (x) = x and S e = {1, 2} with w 1 = 1 and w 2 = 2. Then the joint cost that the players have to share is (w 1 + w 2 ) 2 = 9. The Shapley share of player 1 is
Similarly, we get χ 2,e = 6 and see that the cost shares are proportional. Now suppose that c e (x) = x 2 and S e remains the same. The joint cost is (w 1 + w 2 ) 3 = 27 and
thus, the cost shares are not proportional.
Define a function by
for some ordering π on S e . For this definition to make sense, it must be the case that the right-hand side of (6) is independent of the ordering π . This is a special case of a result of Hart and Mas-Colell [1989] (see Section 3.3), for which we give a direct proof.
PROPOSITION 3.7. For every joint cost function C with player set S, the value of i∈S
is the same for every ordering π of S, where τ i is a permutation of S i (π ) ∪ {i} chosen uniformly at random and S i (π, τ i ) denotes the players of S that precede i in both π and τ i .
PROOF. For a fixed ordering π of the players, the quantity in (7) can be written as a sum of the form T ⊆S a T c(T ) for some set {a T } T ⊆S of coefficients. We now explicitly compute these coefficients and show that they do not depend on π .
Fix a subset T ⊆ S. With respect to the ordering π , let i denote the last player of T , say in position . There is a positive contribution to the coefficient a T from the th summand of (7), and a negative contribution from all subsequent summands. The positive contribution equals the probability that, among all random orderings of the players of S i (π ) ∪ {i}, the players of T come first and player i is the last of these. This probability is
Let i j denote the jth player in the ordering π for some j > . The negative contribution to the coefficient a T by the jth summand of (7) equals the probability that, among all random orderings of the first j players under π , the players of T come first and are immediately followed by player i j . This probability is
Summing over all players j > after T under π and rewriting, we obtain
where k is the number of players in S. Since
for every j > , the sum in (8) telescopes, and hence,
which is a function only of the sizes k and |T | and is independent of the position of the final element of T in π . We conclude that the sum (7) is the same for every ordering π of the players in S.
The fact that the function is a potential function now follows easily.
PROPOSITION 3.8. For every pair P and P = (P −i , P i ) of path vectors that differ only in the ith component,
PROOF. As in the proof of Proposition 3.3, we can focus on a single edge e ∈ P i \ P i . By Proposition 3.7, we can compute the contribution of e to the left-hand side of (9) using an ordering π of the players in which i follows all of the players of S e . Then, edge e contributes exactly χ i,e (S e ∪ {i}) to both sides of Eq. (9). COROLLARY 3.9. In every SV atomic selfish routing game, better-response dynamics converges to a PNE.
Arbitrary Congestion-Type Games
The (weighted) Shapley shares in Definitions 3.1 and 3.5 can be generalized to arbitrary congestion-type games. Consider a resource set E and a player set S = {1, 2, . . . , k}, where each resource e has a joint cost functions C e : 2 S → R defined on the subsets of S, and each player i has a strategy set P i ⊆ 2 E and a positive weight w i . For a resource e, subset S e of players, and a player i ∈ S e , define the weighted Shapley share χ i,e (S e ) of i for resource e when its users are S e as its weighted Shapley value (Section 2) in the game with player set S e and cost function C e restricted to 2 S e . The cost C i (P) to a player i in a strategy profile P is then defined as the sum of its cost shares:
where S e = { j ∈ S : e ∈ P j } denotes the users of resource e in the profile P.
We claim that every game defined in this way admits a weighted potential function and hence better-response dynamics converges to a PNE. The argument follows that in Section 3.2. Define a function = e∈E e (P) in which the edge potential e is defined as
for some ordering π on the players S e using e in P. Hart and Mas-Colell [1989] prove that the right-hand side of (10) is independent of the ordering π , for every joint cost functions C e and positive weight vector w. The proof that is a weighted potential function is the same as in the proof of Proposition 3.8.
THE PRICE OF STABILITY IN SV NETWORK COST-SHARING GAMES
This section provides tight bounds on the price of stability in SV network cost-sharing games-the ratio between the cost of the best PNE and the minimum-cost outcome. It is easy to see that, for every weight vector with k players, the worst PNE of such a game can cost k times as much as an optimal solution, and that this is tight [Chen et al. 2010] .
Section 4.1 generalizes a construction of Anshelevich et al. [2008] to players with general weights. Section 4.2 is the primary contribution of this section, a matching upper bound for every positive weight vector.
POS Lower Bound
Consider a graph G = (V, E) and players i = 1, 2, . . . , k with distinct source vertices s 1 , . . . , s k and a common sink vertex t; see also Figure 2 . As usual, we assume that w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ · · · ≤ w k . The graph has one additional vertex v. There is an edge from v to t with cost 1 + , where > 0 is arbitrarily small. For each i, there is a zerocost edge from s i to v. For each i, the edge from s i to t is set to the weighted Shapley share of the ith player for a unit-cost edge shared by players with weights w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i ; we denote the quantity by c i ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i }).
In the graph G, each player i can either use the path s i → v → t, or use the direct edge from s i to t. The optimal solution, in which every player i chooses the path s i → v → t, has cost 1 + . We claim that in the unique PNE of this SV network cost-sharing 21:10 K. Kollias and T. Roughgarden game, every player i chooses the direct s i -t edge. To see this, consider the player k with the largest weight. The smallest cost it could have by taking the two-hop path is (1 + ) · c k ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w k }), which occurs when all players share the edge from v to t. This is larger than the cost of its one-hop path. Hence, in every PNE, player k uses its one-hop path and does not share the edge from v to t. The same reasoning applies inductively, showing that in every PNE, every player uses its one-hop path. This construction gives the following lower bound for every positive weight vector w. 
Setting w = (1, 1, . . . , 1) recovers the well-known lower bound of H k on the price of stability with unweighted players [Anshelevich et al. 2008 ].
POS Upper Bound
The goal of this section is to prove that the lower bound in Proposition 4.1 is tight for every weight vector w. 
The special case of unweighted players, where the bound (12) is the kth Harmonic number H k , has a short proof: the potential function in (2) is always at least and never more than H k times the cost of an outcome, so the potential function minimizer (a PNE) has cost at most H k times that of an optimal outcome. With weighted players, the weighted potential function (2) need not approximate the cost of an outcome to any nontrivial factor, and a different argument is called for.
The high-level plan is as follows. We consider a minimum-cost outcome P * and the outcome P that minimizes the weighted potential function (2). To bound the cost of P in terms of P * , we transform P * into P one component at a time, in decreasing order of player weight. The change in outcome cost is the change in the deviating player's cost, which we can bound using the weighted potential function, plus the change in other players' cost. We argue that the worst case occurs when the deviating player abandons all edges it was using previously and switches only to edges that were previously unused. Bounding the cost of this worst case yields the theorem.
Before proceeding to the formal proof of Theorem 4.2, we prove a technical lemma. It states that the upper bound in (12) is nondecreasing in the player set. This is not obvious, as deleting a player removes one summand from (12) but also increases the value of some of the remaining summands. 
PROOF (LEMMA 4.3). The first j − 1 summands on both sides are the same. Only the left-hand side of (13) has a summand with i = j, namely, c j ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w j }).
For i > j, the ith summand on the left-hand side (c i ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i })) is smaller than the corresponding summand on the right-hand side (c i ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w j−1 , w j+1 , . . . , w i })). To calculate the difference, we turn to the probabilistic representation of weighted Shapley shares in terms of exponentially distributed random variables X 1 , . . . , X k (Section 3.1).
In the right-hand side summand, the random variable X i does not have to compete with X j in order to be the largest. Hence, the event that X i is smaller than X j but larger than every other player's random variable contributes to c i ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w j−1 , w j+1 , . . . , w i }) but not to c i ({w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i }). We denote this probability by p j (i). Recalling the density and distribution functions of exponentially distributed random variables, we have
Recalling that w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ · · · ≤ w k and hence λ 1 ≥ λ 2 ≥ · · · ≥ λ k , the difference between the left-hand and right-hand sides of Eq. (13) is
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(1 − e −λ j ·x )
Here, (14) and (15) follow by definition (of , the weighted Shapley value c j (·), and p j (i)), (16) follows by the monotonicity of λ · e λ·x as a function of λ and by the fact that the values of λ are nonincreasing, (17) follows by taking out the common factor, (18) follows by evaluating the last product, and (19), as explained after the comment. This concludes the proof of the lemma.
We now prove Theorem 4.2 PROOF (THEOREM 4.2). Let P * and P denote a minimum-cost outcome and an outcome that minimizes the weighted potential function in (2), respectively. For the analysis, we imagine each player i deviating from P * i to P i in nonincreasing weight order, that is, in the order k, k − 1, . . . , 1. Let T i e denote the players using edge e before player i switches strategies, and let i denote the change in when i switches strategies. By Proposition 3.3, the change in player i's cost is exactly ( i )/w i . To compute the change in other players' costs, recall that the sum of the weighted Shapley shares of an edge used by at least one player always equals the cost of that edge. Thus, for every edge e ∈ P * i \ P i with |T i e | ≥ 2, player i's withdrawal from edge e increases the sum of the cost shares of the players of T i e \ {i} by χ i,e (T i e ). Symmetrically, for every edge e ∈ P i \ P * i , player i's arrival to edge e decreases the sum of cost shares of players in T i e (if any) by χ i,e (T i e ∪{i}). Overall, when player i switches from P * i to P i , the outcome cost increases by at most
Summing over all players i, we obtain
To bound the first term of the right-hand side of (20), write
Since w 1 ≤ w 2 ≤ · · · ≤ w k , every term ( 
The right-hand side of (22) corresponds to the scenario in which every user of e in P * abandons e when switching to its strategy in P.
Inequality (22) follows from three observations. First, for each = 2, 3, . . . , |S * e |, the right-hand side of (22) contains h ≥ 0 players with index higher than j, who have already deviated to another path that contains e, and the − h lowest-weight players of S * e , of which j has maximum weight. Third, Definition 3.1 implies that the weighted Shapley share of a player is increasing in its own weight and decreasing in other players' weights. Thus, for every = 2, 3, . . . , |S * e |, the summand on the right-hand side of (22) 
where (23) follows from (20), (21), and (22), (24) is given by a simple transformation, and (25) follows by applying Lemma 4.3. Then, by the fact that C(P * ) = e : S * e =∅ γ e ,
which proves the theorem.
As a special case, if players' weights are within a constant factor of each other, then c i (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w i ) = (1/i) for every i, and the POS is O(log k). In contrast, when PNE exists under proportional cost shares, the POS in this case can be (k) [Chen and Roughgarden 2009] .
More generally, the POS bound in Proposition 4.1 and Theorem 4.2 approaches k as the players' weights become more dramatically spread out. For example, when w i = i for i = 1, 2, . . . , k, calculations show that the POS is O( √ k).
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THE PRICE OF ANARCHY IN SV ATOMIC SELFISH ROUTING GAMES
This section gives matching upper and lower bounds on the worst-case price of anarchy in SV atomic selfish routing games. Section 5.1 covers preliminaries. Section 5.2 proves a POA upper bound that is parameterized by the set of resource cost functions. Section 5.3 evaluates this upper bound for cost functions that are polynomials with nonnegative coefficients. Section 5.4 gives a construction showing that, for every set of cost functions satisfying some mild technical conditions, this POA upper bound is tight in the worst case.
Preliminaries
The worst-case POA in SV atomic selfish routing games depends on the set of allowable cost functions. For example, with cost functions that are polynomials with degree at most d and nonnegative coefficients, we prove that the worst-case POA is exponential in d, but independent of the network size and the number of players. This dependence motivates parameterizing our POA bounds by the class C of allowable resource cost functions. We do not expect the worst-case POA to admit a closed-form expression for every set C, and instead seek a relatively simple characterization of this value. Throughout this section, we make the following assumptions.
(1) Every cost function c ∈ C is nonnegative, nondecreasing, and convex.
(2) The set C is closed under scaling and dilation, meaning that if c(x) ∈ C and a,
POA Upper Bound
Our upper bound approach is an instantiation of the "smoothness framework" articulated in Roughgarden [2009] . Let ξ c (x, x * ) denote the worst-case Shapley share of a player with weight x * on a resource with cost function c, when the total weight of the other players on the resource is x. This worst-case is taken over all possible sets of players with total weight x. We call a pair (λ, μ) of real numbers feasible for a cost function c if μ < 1 and if
for every x, x * ≥ 0. We use A(C) to denote the set of pairs (λ, μ) that are feasible for every cost function c ∈ C. Define
Under the assumptions described in Section 5.1, ζ (C) is an upper bound on the POA of every SV atomic selfish routing game with cost functions in C.
THEOREM 5.1. Let C be a set of nonnegative, nondecreasing, and convex cost functions. Then the POA of every SV atomic selfish routing game with cost functions in C is at most ζ (C).
PROOF. Let P and P * denote a PNE and an arbitrary outcome of such a routing game with players S = {1, 2, . . . , k}. Since P is a PNE, we have
where S e denotes the players using edge e in P. By the definition of ξ c (x * , x),
where w i is the weight of player i and x e the total weight of the players in S e . Then we get
where x * e denotes the total weight of players using edge e in P * . The second inequality follows from the fact that c e is convex, with the following reasoning: given that c e is convex and increasing, it follows that, for every x, the function (w + x)·c e (w + x)− x ·c e (x) is convex in w. Now consider any subset of e's users T ⊆ S e such that i∈T w i = x, and suppose there is a set of players T * such that i∈T * w i = x * e . If we place each i ∈ T * , on resource e with the other users being T , we get a marginal increase δ i = (w i + x) · c e (w i + x) − x · c e (x). Since, as we argued, this is a convex expression in w i , the sum i∈T * δ i is maximized when there is only one player in T * . The Shapley value is a sum over all possible orderings, hence over several possible sets T ⊆ S e , which implies that the sum of the Shapley values is again maximized when there is a single player in T * , which concludes the proof of our claim. Now choose (λ, μ) ∈ A(C). Since (λ, μ) satisfies Eq. (26) for all c ∈ C and x, x * ≥ 0, we have
rearranging terms completes the proof.
Remark 5.2. The POA upper bound in Theorem 5.1 is a "smoothness proof " in the sense of Roughgarden [2009] . Informally, this means that the hypothesis that P is a PNE is used only in equality (27), with hypothetical deviations P * i that are independent of the choice of P. This fact is interesting because POA bounds that are proved with smoothness arguments extend automatically to numerous other equilibrium concepts. Specifically, the POA upper bound of ζ (C) applies more generally to mixed-strategy Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and outcome sequences generated by no-regret learners [Roughgarden 2009 ]. Approximate Nash equilibria and polynomial-length best-response sequences also approximately obey the ζ (C) bound [Roughgarden 2009 ]. Finally, the POA bound of ζ (C) extends to all Bayes-Nash equilibria of incomplete information SV selfish routing games, where players' weights and source-sink pairs are drawn from an arbitrary product prior distribution [Roughgarden 2012; Syrgkanis 2012] .
Example: Polynomial Cost Functions
This section explicitly evaluates the POA upper bound in Theorem 5.1 for the special case in which C is the set of polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degree d.
Elementary calculus shows that, for every positive integer d, the function
has a unique positive root, which we denote by χ d . This section establishes the following theorem.
THEOREM 5.3. If C is the set of polynomials with nonnegative coefficients and maximum degree d, then the POA of a SV atomic selfish routing game with cost functions in
Remark 5.7 shows that the bound of χ d+1 d
is tight in the worst case, for every positive integer d. For comparison, the worst-case POA with proportional (rather than SV) cost-sharing, in such games that happen to possess PNE, is the slightly smaller quantity ((d/ ln d) d+1 ). Before presenting the proof of Theorem 5.3, we examine the asymptotic behavior of χ d .
PROOF. Note that
Similarly, Define
We begin by showing that (λ, μ) is feasible. To see that μ < 1, recall that, by definition,
If
. Combining this with (30) yields the contradiction 3 · χ j j ≤ −1. To see that (λ, μ) satisfies (26) for every cost function c e ∈ C, fix a specific resource e, a set of users S e , and a player i, outside S e . By Definition 3.5,
where w i is the weight of player i and X i,e is the total weight of the players preceding i in a uniformly random ordering of the players in S e ∪ {i}.
Let x e denote the total weight of the players in S e . Pairing up subsets of S e with their complements, the right-hand side of (31) is a convex combination of terms of the form
Since c e (x) is a polynomial with nonnegative coefficients, the term (x + w i ) · c e (x + w i ) − x · c e (x) is convex and nondecreasing in x. It then follows that each of these terms is maximized when z = x e . Thus,
where x * e denotes the total weight of players using edge e in P * , with the second inequality following from the fact that the function (
By linearity, Condition (26) reduces to proving that
for every j = 1, 2, . . . , d and x, x * ≥ 0. Every λ n , μ n pair clearly satisfies Inequality (32) when x * = 0. Assume that x * > 0 and set r = x/x * . Rewrite Inequality (32) as
Considering the left-hand side of (33) as a function of r and taking the derivative, we can see that the minimizer is r = ((2μ + 1) 1/j − 1) −1 = χ j . With these values of r, λ j , μ j , the left-hand side of (33) equals 0, which verifies Inequality (33) (and (32) ). Inequality (32) clearly remains valid for λ ≥ λ j and μ ≥ μ j , and so (λ, μ) form a feasible pair.
To
, recall that λ = λ d and write μ = μ for some ∈ {1, 2, . . . , d}. Then,
where the last step follows from (30). The last expression is clearly increasing in . Hence, setting = d and using (30) once again, we derive λ
, as required. 
POA Lower Bound
The upper bounds presented in Section 5.2 are tight in the worst case. The construction that proves this is simplest to present in the context of general congestion games, where players have strategy sets that are arbitrary subsets of the edges and not necessarily paths. It is easy to convert the construction into an atomic selfish routing network.
THEOREM 5.5. For every class C that is closed under scaling and dilation, the POA of an SV atomic congestion game with cost functions in C can be arbitrarily close to ζ (C).
Our construction resembles one used previously to prove POA lower bounds for weighted congestion games with proportional cost shares [Bhawalkar et al. 2010] , but some of the technical details differ. Our proof of Theorem 5.5 requires the following technical lemma.
LEMMA 5.6. Let C be a class of cost functions with ζ (C) > 1. For every positive < ζ (C) − 1, at least one of the following conditions holds.
and
The intuition behind the lemma and the subsequent construction is as follows. The optimal (λ, μ) lies on the two-dimensional space and within a polytope. It will either be very close to a single constraint or to the intersection of two constraints. Then we can use that single constraint or a convex combination of the two intersecting constraints to construct a lower bound with every player (other than the leaf players) facing a situation equivalent to what the constraints describe.
As an example, for the case with a single constraint, each player faces the equivalent of the following situation: The player has weight x * and can deviate to a resource with cost function c where there are already players with total weight x (the actual distribution of the weight x among the various players is as in the worst case for the player with weight x * ). To obtain a tight bound we will have to make every player indifferent between the equilibrium strategy and the potential deviation. After a very large number of layers of such players, the construction is terminated by a final layer of players such that each one is indifferent between the equilibrium strategy and a currently empty resource of equal cost. This means all the players in the final layer have the same cost in the optimal solution and in the equilibrium, so their contribution to the total cost must be negligible for the POA bound to be tight. For this to be true, the cost of players as layers progress must not increase, which translates to the condition ξ c (x
is the equilibrium cost of the x * player (given that, as mentioned, the players are indifferent between their equilibrium strategies and their potential deviations) and the overall cost of the player's competitors in the lower layer is x · c(x).
For the case when two constraints intersect near the optimal (λ, μ) pair, the corresponding c 1 , x 1 , x single c, x, x * which satisfies the "correct lower bound conditions" we described in the previous paragraph.
The proof of Lemma 5.6 geometrically describes why we can always find the necessary constraints (lines in the two-dimensional space), and the proof of Theorem 5.5 describes the details of the lower bound construction that uses these constraints.
PROOF (LEMMA 5.6) . For a cost function c ∈ C, x ≥ 0, and x * > 0, let H c,x,x * denote the half-plane
and ∂H c,x,x * the boundary of this half-plane. Recall from (26) that these are the halfplanes that define the set A(C) of feasible pairs (λ, μ) for the set C of cost functions. Also, define
If we think of a boundary line ∂H c,x,x * as specifying μ as a function of λ, then this line has slope −1/ζ c,x,x * and μ-intercept 1/β c,x,x * . The half-space H c,x,x * consists of everything "northeast" of its boundary.
Consider the half-planes with β c,x,x * ≤ 1. In the lucky event that there is such a half-plane with ζ c,x,x * ≥ ζ , we are done: this choice of c, x, x * satisfies the first set of conditions of the lemma. For the rest of the proof, we assume that ζ c,x,x * < ζ for every half-plane with β c,x,x * ≤ 1.
We consider two cases. To define them, pick an arbitrary cost function c 1 with c 1 (1) > 0-since C is closed under dilation, such a function exists-and a sufficiently large value of x 1 so that ζ c 1 ,x 1 ,1 > ζ . Our standing assumption implies that β c 1 ,x 1 ,1 > 1. Define (λ,μ) as the unique point of intersection of ∂ H c 1 ,x 1 ,1 and L ζ . Since the former line has a larger slope (−1/ζ c 1 ,x 1 ,1 vs. −1/ζ ) and a smaller μ-intercept (1/β c 1 ,x 1 ,1 vs. 1) than the latter,λ > 0 and henceμ < 1.
For Case (i), we assume that there exists a half-plane H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 with β c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 < 1 whose boundary intersects the line L ζ at a point (λ 2 , μ 2 ) with μ 2 <μ. Equivalently, the line ∂H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 intersects L ζ to the right of where
and ∂H c 1 ,x 1 ,1 (namely, 1/β c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 > 1 and 1/β c 1 ,x 1 ,1 < 1) are on either side of that of L ζ (namely, 1) andλ > 0, this implies that the intersection (λ, μ) of ∂H c 1 ,x 1 ,1 and ∂H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 lies on the "northeast side" of L ζ . It follows that λ + ζ · μ ≥ ζ . Thus, c 1 , c 2 , x 1 , x 2 , 1, x * 2 , λ, μ satisfy the conditions in the second set of conditions of the lemma. This argument is illustrated in Figure 3 .
Finally, assume that all half-planes H c,x,x * with β c,x,x * < 1 have boundaries that intersect the line L ζ at points (λ, μ) with μ ≥μ. This is handled by Case (ii), which is illustrated in Figure 4 . Let μ * denote the infimum of all μ-coordinates of such intersections. Under our standing assumption, every such boundary ∂H c,x,x * has a smaller slope (−1/ζ c,x,x * vs. −1/ζ ) and a larger μ-intercept (1/β c 1 ,x 1 ,1 vs. 1) than L ζ , and hence intersects L ζ at a point (λ, μ) with 1 > μ ≥μ. Thus, 1 > μ * ≥μ. We now find appropriate (c 1 , x 1 , x * 1 ) and (c 2 , x 2 , x * 2 ) with β c 1 ,x 1 ,x * 1 ≥ 1 and β c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 < 1, such that the corresponding half-plane boundaries intersect L ζ at points (λ 1 , μ 1 ) intersects L ζ at a point (λ 1 , μ 1 ) with μ 1 ≥ μ * − δ. Moreover, λ 1 + ζ · μ 1 = ζ .
If μ 1 > μ * , then we can find (c 2 , x 2 , x * 2 ) with β c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 < 1 that intersects L ζ at (λ 2 , μ 2 ) with μ * ≤ μ 2 ≤ μ 1 . Then, similarly to the previous case, ∂H c 1 ,x 1 ,x * 1 and ∂H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 intersect at a point (λ, μ) such that λ/(1 − μ) ≥ ζ , completing the proof.
We can now assume that μ * − δ ≤ μ 1 ≤ μ * . By the definition of μ * , there exist (c 2 , x 2 , x * 2 ) such that ∂H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 intersects L ζ at (λ 2 , μ 2 ), with μ * ≤ μ 2 ≤ μ * + δ. Note that μ 2 ≥ μ 1 and λ 2 + ζ · μ 2 = ζ .
Let (λ, μ) be the point where ∂H c 1 ,x 1 ,x * 1 and ∂H c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 intersect. Both these boundaries have negative slopes, which means (λ, μ) lies in the triangle formed by the points (λ 1 , μ 1 ), (λ 2 , μ 2 ), and (λ 2 , μ 1 ). Then λ/(1 − μ) ≥ λ 2 /(1 − μ 1 ). Since λ 1 − λ 2 = ζ · (μ 2 − μ 1 ) ≤ 2 · ζ · δ, we have
This proves that the second set of conditions in the statement of the lemma holds.
Before proceeding with the proof of Theorem 5.5, we take note of some consequences of Lemma 5.6. Suppose the second case of the lemma applies and offers two triples (c 1 , x 1 , x * 1 ) and (c 2 , x 2 , x * 2 ) such that the corresponding half-plane boundaries intersect at (λ, μ) with λ/(1 − μ) > ζ(C) − . Scaling and dilating a cost function does not affect the corresponding Constraint (26). Thus, for every w > 0, we can find cost functionsĉ 1 andĉ 2 such that ξĉ 1 (w, w · z 1 ) = λ · w ·ĉ 1 (w) + μ · w · z 1 ·ĉ 1 (w · z 1 ); ξĉ 2 (w, w · z 2 ) = λ · w ·ĉ 2 (w) + μ · w · z 2 ·ĉ 2 (w · z 2 ),
where z 1 = x 1 /x * 1 and z 2 = x 2 /x * 2 . Moreover, since ξĉ 1 (w, w · z 1 ) ≤ z 1 ·ĉ 1 (z 1 · w) and ξĉ 2 (w, w · z 2 ) ≥ z 2 ·ĉ 2 (z 2 · w), there is a constant η ∈ [0, 1] such that η · z 1 ·ĉ 1 (w · z 1 ) + (1 − η) · z 2 ·ĉ 2 (w · z 2 ) = η · ξĉ 1 (w, w · z 1 ) +(1 − η) · ξĉ 2 (w, w · z 2 ).
We now give our lower-bound construction.
PROOF (THEOREM 5.5). Our proof has two cases, corresponding to the two sets of conditions of Lemma 5.6. First, consider a set C and > 0 so that the second set of conditions of the lemma applies and the corresponding triples are (c 1 , x 1 , x * 1 ) and (c 2 , x 2 , x * 2 ). We write S c 1 ,x 1 ,x * 1 for the set of players with total weight x 1 that yield the Shapley share of ξ c 1 (x * 1 , x 1 ) for the player with weight x * 1 . Similarly, we write S c 2 ,x 2 ,x * 2 for the corresponding set of players of the second triple.
We now describe our game, the equilibrium strategies, and the potential deviations of the players in S. The construction is organized into m layers of resources. The first layer has a single resource and a single player using that resource in our proposed equilibrium, P. This player has weight 1 and the cost function of the resource is c ∈ C such that c(1) = 1 (such a function clearly exists, since C is closed under dilation). We now recursively present the following layers, up to the (m − 1)th layer.
Consider any player that is using a resource on the ith layer, with i < m − 1, in the proposed equilibrium P. Suppose this player has weight w i and cost c i in P. There is only one other alternative strategy for the player, which is to play a pair of resources, l, r, from the (i + 1)th layer. There is a unique l, r pair of resources in the (i + 1)th layer for every player in the ith layer. We now pick the cost functions for l and r and the set of players using l and r in P. We start with the sets of users in P. The users of l are |S c 1 ,x 1 ,x
